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Landowner and Landlord Liability for the
Nuisance-Causing Actions of Third Parties on the
Landowner/Landlord’s Land: an Analysis of
Brumby v Octavia Housing
Ian Loveland
CITY UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL AND ARDEN CHAMBERS
Introduction
If one is an academic lawyer who also runs a practise at the bar, then one of the more satisfying elements
of that dual identity is to write an article in an academic journal which either questions and criticises a
prevailing assumption; to receive some complimentary comments on the paper from several solicitors; to
find out that when a client walks through the one of those solicitors’ doors with the problem you discussed
the solicitor concerned remembers the paper, and then briefs you to run the case which you then argue
successfully in the county court and on appeal.
From a personal perspective, that is perhaps what makes Brumby v Octavia Hill Housing Trust1 a
memorable case. But the judgment—and conduct of the litigation which led to the judgment—also raises
two issues of rather more general interest and significance. The first issue is that the case re-states what
ought to have been the perfectly clear current state of the common law with respect to landowner/landlord
liability for the nuisance-causing actions of third parties on the landowner/landlord’s land. The second
issue is that the clarity of the law was at a practical level perhaps being substantially misunderstood and/or
misrepresented by many housing lawyers.
A clear rule of common law? Landlords cannot be liable in nuisance to neighbours for
nuisance caused by the anti-social behaviour of the landlord’s tenants
There is a prevailing assumption among English housing lawyers that landlords simply cannot be liable
in nuisance to their tenants or to owner-occupiers for the anti-social behaviour of other tenants. The
assumption is usually supported with reference to two relatively recent Court of Appeal authorities;Mowam
v Wandsworth LBC2 and Hussain v Lancaster CC.3
The claimant in Mowam lived in a ex-council flat (which she had bought) in a converted house. Her
upstairs neighbour, a tenant of the local authority, had psychiatric problems which led her to be an
extraordinarily unpleasant person to live close to. She was constantly noisy and abusive, and in short made
Mrs Mowam’s life a misery for several years.
Ms Mowam could obviously have sued the neighbour in nuisance, or perhaps brought an action under
the Protection From Harassment Act 1997. But those would have been futile remedies. The neighbour
had no money to pay damages, and there was a very large question mark as to whether a court would even
grant still less enforce an injunction against her given her state of health. Mrs Mowan therefore sued the
1Brumby v Octavia Hill Housing Trust [2010] EWHC 1793 (QB).2Mowam v Wandsworth LBC (2001) 33 H.L.R. 56 CA.3Hussain v Lancaster CC [2000] Q.B. 1 CA.
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neighbour’s landlord in nuisance, her argument being that the council was liable to her because it had not
taken any steps to end or ameliorate the nuisance.
Mr Hussain had the great misfortune to own a corner-shop and flat in a neighbourhood containing a
very large number of white racist thugs, who subjected him to an appalling campaign of violence and
abuse. Some of the perpetrators were evidently council tenants or people who resided with such tenants.
Others were visitors to people who lived on the estate. Mr Hussein too sued the local authority, both in
nuisance and negligence for failing to take effective steps to stop the problem.
Both claimants failed. And they failed because—according to the prevailing assumption—a landlord
simply cannot be liable to a neighbouring occupier for the nuisance-causing activities of its tenants or
other third parties unless the claimant can prove that the landlord/landowner actively participated in or
encouraged the nuisance causing behaviour.
Questioning and critiquing the prevailing assumption
This author wrote two articles in 2005 which were published in this journal which analysed this area of
the law.4 In the second article, I had indulged my academic’s prerogative and argued that the rule inMowam
was undesirable as a matter of policy and poorly founded as a matter of law, and ought to be overturned
as soon as possible.
The first paper was rather less ambitious. What I tried to do in that article was warn against the danger
of Mowam and Hussain being lent an exaggerated reach which would obscure some really quite basic
principles of land and tort law. In particular, I wanted to make the point that in order to be good law in a
formal sense Mowam and Hussain both had to be read in a way which was consistent with the by then
venerable but apparently sometimes forgotten—at least by housing lawyers—judgment of the House of
Lords in Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan.5
Sedleigh-Denfield is a case which most law students will have encountered when studying tort law.
What Sedleigh-Denfield established—overturning previous authority6—was that a landowner (L) who
knows that third party (T) is using land of which L is in possession in a way that causes a nuisance to a
neighbour (N) will be liable in nuisance to N for any loss caused to N by T if either: (i) L encouraged or
participated in T’s actions; or (ii) L “continued” or “adopted” the nuisance, by which is meant that L did
not encourage or participate in T’s actions, but knew about them and did not take such steps as were
reasonable in the circumstances to stop them.7
From a Sedleigh-Denfield perspective, the crucial initial question is not “Who caused the nuisance?”;
but “Who is in possession of the land where the nuisance comes from?”. One needs perhaps to be alert to
the very expansive sense in which “land” is being used here. In a block of flats for example, a communal
doorway, a staircase, a lift, an external entrance area or a shared garden are all likely to be land in the
possession of the landlord and so potential sources of Sedleigh-Denfield nuisance.
4 Ian Loveland, “Landlord liability for anti-social behaviour of their tenants 1: stretching the orthodox position” (2005a) Journal of Planning and
Environmental Law 273–282: Ian Loveland, “Landlord liability for anti-social behaviour of their tenants 2: Challenging the orthodox position” [2005]
J.P.L. 405–418.5 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callagan (Trustees for St Joseph’s Society for Foreign Missions) [1940] A.C. 880.6 Job Edwards v Birmingham Navigations Proprietors [1924] 1 K.B. 341.7The most pertinent passages are per Viscount Maugham in Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callagan (Trustees for St Joseph’s Society for Foreign Missions)
[1940] A.C. 880 at 894: “The statement that an occupier of land is liable for the continuance of a nuisance created by others, e.g. by trespassers, if he
continues or adopts it—which seems to be agreed—throws little light on the matter, unless the words ‘continues or adopts’ are defined. In my opinion
an occupier of land ‘continues’ a nuisance if with knowledge or presumed knowledge of its existence he fails to take any reasonable means to bring it
to an end though with ample time to do so”; per Lord Atkin at 897: “It seems to me clear that if a man permits an offensive thing on his premises to
continue to offend, that is, if he knows that it is operating offensively, is able to prevent it, and omits to prevent it, he is permitting the nuisance to
continue; in other words he is continuing it.”; and per Lord Wright at 904–905: “Though the rule has not been laid down by this House, it has I think
been rightly established in the Court of Appeal that an occupier is not prima facie responsible for a nuisance created without his knowledge and consent.
If he is to be liable a further condition is necessary, namely, that he had knowledge or means of knowledge, that he knew or should have known of the
nuisance in time to correct it and obviate its mischievous effects … This rule seems to be in accordance with good sense and convenience”.
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The nature of the nuisance in Sedleigh-Denfield was physical damage to land; specifically flooding
which resulted from an action of a trespasser who had blocked a culvert on the defendant’s property. But
the principle has on several subsequent occasions been expressly applied to “human behaviour” nuisance,
including inter alia littering, polluting, excessive noise and—perhaps most prosaically—the blocking of
designated parking spaces.8 The basic point made in all these cases is that a nuisance action is concerned
with the impact that something on or emanating from D’s land has on C’s user of her land. Whether the
something be a flood, a fire, a rock concert, a group of drug-dealers or a bunch of rowdily obnoxious
teenagers is of no significance.
Subsequent authority has also clarified the nature of Sedleigh-Denfield’s “reasonableness” test. In
assessing if a given response would have been reasonable, the court will evaluate such matter as, inter
alia, the gravity and duration of the nuisance, the costs of removing or reducing it, the relative financial
resources of the parties.9 The reasonableness test in this context is a remarkably broad one, and belies any
suggestion that one is here in the realm of a strict liability tort.
Mowam did not seem to be a Sedleigh-Denfield case. Mrs Mowam lived in a flat in a converted house.
The only land in close proximity to her flat which was in the possession of the landlord would have been
the front garden area, and the communal hallway and staircase. It did not seem that any of the nuisance
came from those areas. It all came from the behaviour of the other tenant in the other tenant’s flat.
But if the nuisance had emanated from land still in possession of the landlord (the gardens, the stairwell
or the hallway), then the Sedleigh-Denfield test as to the source of the nuisance would be met. As indeed
it would be met if the nuisance had been caused not by another tenant of the landlord but by trespassers
on the relevant land or bare licencees who were visiting the premises. Questions as to liability would then
turn on whether and for how long the landlord had known of the problem and whether the landlord could
have taken reasonable steps to stop it.
Mrs Mowam failed because she was trying to change the law. She was trying to turn nuisance into a
tort about the relationship between people per se rather than about the relationship between people’s land.
She was almost one might think—although the point was not clearly put to the court—seeking to bring
landowners within the reach of theHedley-Byrne10 special relationship principle vis a vis their neighbours.
Hussain is rather more messy conceptually and—with respect as we say—it was not reasoned and
perhaps not pleaded very clearly. The local authority certainly knew about the anti-social behaviour, and
had not in Mr Hussain’s view done enough to try to stop it. It also seems that that all of the behaviour
concerned there came from land which was “in the possession” of the local authority in a strictly formal
sense. But one must perhaps regard use of the term “in the possession of the local authority” guardedly,
because the land concerned was the public roadway and pavements which permeated the housing estate
where Mr Hussain’s shop was located.
Sedleigh-Denfield does not appear to have received much attention in Hussain, but one must assume
that the Court of Appeal was aware of the case and structured its reasoning accordingly. There are perhaps
two ways in which Hussain can be squared with Sedleigh-Denfield.
The first is that we can properly draw in a pure doctrinal sense a distinction for nuisance purposes
between land over which there is presumptively a constant right of public access (as in the housing estate
where Mr Hussin’s shop was located) and land which is presumptively private. The second, and perhaps
better explanation, shades into the first, and is that it very much more difficult to argue that there is any
“reasonable” way for a landowner to control the behaviour of third parties on a public highway, albeit
8 e.g. Page Motors v Epsom and Ewell BC [1982] J.P.L. 572: Hilton v James Smith & Sons (Norwood) Ltd [1979] 2 E.G.L.R. 44: Lippiatt v South
Gloucestershire CC [2000] Q.B. 51 CA:Winch v Mid-Bedfordshire DC unreported, July 22, 2002) and the discussion in S. Bright “Landowner’s
responsibility in nuisance for anti-social behaviour” (2003) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 171.9 See especially Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 A.C. 645 PC per Lord Wilberforce at 663: Leakey v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest
or Natural Beauty [1980] Q.B. 485.10Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] A.C. 465.
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that the council was strictu sense the “owner” of the highways concerned. The “reasonableness” argument
acquiresmore force in the specific context ofHussain becausemuch of the problematic behaviourmanifestly
amounted to criminal (and often seriously so) activity, which might readily be thought to be the province
of the police and the criminal law rather than local authority and the civil courts.11
The extension of the Sedleigh-Denfield principle to human behaviour nuisance was fiercely criticised
by Professor Bright in a paper published in the in 2001 paper entitled “Liability for the bad behaviour of
others”.12 The gist of her argument was that liability should only arise on proof of “fault” in a positive
rather than negative sense:
“The fundamental criticism of applying the ‘continuation principle’ taken from Sedleigh-Denfield
to bad behaviour cases is that ignores the fact that the nuisance creators are autonomous third parties
for whom the property owner has no legal responsibility.”
Professor Bright perhaps falls here into the trap of characterising nuisance as a tort about people rather
than about land. It might also be suggested that she is using the title of the argument rather than its substance
to make her case. The substantive issue is really:
“Landowner liability for nuisances emanating from the Landowner’s land which are caused by third
parties and known about by the landowner.”
The policy argument in favour of imposing such liability is relatively straightforward, particularly in
the context of residential premises and especially so in high density residential areas. The landowner
manifestly can derive a benefit from her land. An obvious example would be a communal front and rear
garden surrounding a block of flats which lessees of the flats are given bare licence to use. The gardens
add to the aesthetic and functional value of the flats even though they are not part of the demised premises,
and as such enable the landowner to charge a higher rent for the flats. Were the landowner to inform
prospective clients that in the event that third parties came into the gardens and caused a severe and
recurrent nuisance to the occupiers of the flats the landowner would do nothing to stop it, the market value
of the flats would presumably decline. More prosaically, communal hallways, staircase and lifts are
essential to occupancy of the flats and as such are an integral part of the rental value. Tenants pay to use
them, and presume such payments includes a proviso that the areas will be nuisance-free. That the landowner
should be liable to her/his tenants for the deleterious effects of third party nuisance in such areas is hardly
a radical proposition.
Terri Brumby’s claim
Terri Brumby had been having difficulties with her accommodation for some time; for four years in fact.
She eventually approached Simon Marciniak, the senior housing solicitor at the London firm of Miles
and Partners. Simon had read the pieces I had written and briefed me to argue the case. In the subsequently
issued Particulars of Claim, we identified Terri’s problem in this way:
“1. This is an action brought by the Claimant against the Defendant for nuisance …
2. The Claimant resides at a flat known as Flat 6, Cartwright House. The premises are a 1
bedroom lower ground floor flat.
3. The Claimant occupies the premises as the assured tenant of the Defendant, under the terms
of an assured tenancy granted on 19.07.1996.
11The case attracted little academic analysis. For an exception see the helpful discussion in J. O’Sullivan (2000) “Nuisance, local authorities and
neighbours from hell” Cambridge L.J. 11.12 Professor Bright , “Liability for the bad behaviour of others” (2001) 2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 311.
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4. Cartwright House is a purpose built, low rise block of flats, believed by the Claimant to
have been built in the early 20th century.
5. The Claimant’s flat is at basement level. Entry to the block for all flats in the Claimant’s
section of the building is through a single communal door, immediately adjacent to and a
few feet higher than the Claimant’s flat. There is a communal hallway and stairwell inside
the entrance door. The Claimant’s flat is situated on the northern side of the communal
staircase.
6. Immediately outside the window of the reception room in the Claimant’s flat is a paved area
3 feet wide, which runs to a ledge some 2 feet high and 3 feet wide, which ledge runs along
width of the Claimant’s flat. (The paved area and ledge are hereafter referred to as ‘the
trench’). There is no gate/fence/hedge etc obstructing or preventing access to ‘the trench’,
nor has there been any such barrier at any time since the Claimant began to reside at flat 6.
13. The Defendant is believed by the Claimant to have retained possession throughout the
relevant period of the footpath from the public pavement to the entrance to the block of flats,
of the external entrance area, of the internal communal hallways and staircase, and of ‘the
trench’ outside the Claimant’s flat.
18. At some point prior to August 2000, the Defendant granted a tenancy of flat 14 Cartwright
House to a Ms Hazel Walker ….
19. Flat 14 is situated on the 4th (top) floor of the block, on the southern side of the communal
staircase.
20. The Defendant was granted a possession order against the said Ms Walker in respect of flat
14 in the Lambeth County Court on 09.08.2000.
22. From September 2003 until May 2007, the Claimant suffered substantial and repeated
interference with the quiet enjoyment of her home as a result of the failure of the Defendant
to prevent a nuisance to the Claimant’s premises emanating from land which the Defendant
owned and in respect of which the Defendant had possession. The said nuisance was the
activities of visitors to Ms Walker’s flat.
23. The source and nature of the nuisance
The aforesaid nuisance-causing activities emanated from land of which the Defendant was
the owner and has always retained possession; namely the external entrance area, the
communal hallway and staircases, and ‘the trench’…
24. The aforesaid nuisance-causing activities are too numerous to particularise in their entirety,
but include the following instances:
(i) PARTICULARS
Visitors to Ms Walker repeatedly stood outside the block in the external entrance
area and shouted loudly up to flat 14 seeking to alert Ms Walker to their presence
so that she could throw down keys to them from her living room window. Such
visits and shouting took place at all times of the day and night.
(ii) On occasions when Ms Walker was not present in her flat or did not hear her
prospective visitors, the said visitors would repeatedly ring the door buzzer of the
other flats in the block, including that of the Claimant, seeking entry to the block.
(iii) On repeated occasions when the said visitors could not secure entry to the block,
one or more of the said visitors would wait for protracted periods in ‘the trench’
outside the Claimant’s flat. The said visitors entered and remained in ‘the trench’
qua trespassers on the Defendant’s land. When in ‘the trench’, the said visitors
would stare into the Claimant’s reception room in a manner which the Claimant
9
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found unnerving and threatening to the extent that she felt compelled always to
keep her windows shut and locked. On occasion, including during night time hours
when the Claimant was asleep, the said visitors would bang on the Claimant’s
window demanding to be let into the block.
(iv) On occasions when Ms Walker was not at home, visitors to Ms Walker’s would
seek to and did push past the Claimant when she sought to enter or exit the block.
(v) Visitors to flat 14 repeatedly made large amounts of noise when moving through
the communal hallways and up the staircase.
(vi) Visitors to flat 14 repeatedly left litter in the communal hallways and on the staircase
and outside the entrance to the block.
(vii) On occasions when one or more of the said visitors had secured access to the block
but Ms Walker was not at home, one of or groups of the said visitors would remain
in the communal areas smoking and drinking alcohol.
(viii) While in the communal areas of the block, some of Ms Walker’s visitors were
repeatedly abusive and threatening towards the Claimant and other residents of the
block.
(ix) In the period late February to early March 2005, the police were repeatedly called
by the Claimant to attend the block because of the alarm and distress caused to the
Claimant by the behaviour of visitors to flat 14.
(x) Visitors to flat 14 frequently left the front door to the block open in order to facilitate
access for other visitors to flat 14, thereby compromising the security of the block.
(xi) Visitors to flat 14 on occasion intercepted the Claimant’ mail; (mail to all the flats
being delivered through a single slot in the front door to the block and thence falling
to the floor of the communal hallway).
25. The activities of MsWalker’s visitors were of such a nature as to as to amount to a nuisance
to the Claimant, in that their effect was to detract substantially from the amenity of the
Claimant’s flat throughout the period from September 2003 to May 2007 …
26. The Defendant, being the owner of and in possession of the land from which the nuisance
to the Claimant’s land emanated, is liable to the Claimant in nuisance… for loss of amenity
caused to the Claimant’s land by the said nuisance if the following conditions are met:
(a) The Defendant knew of the continuing, recurrent nature of the nuisance; and
(b) The Defendant failed to take such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances to
bring the nuisance promptly and effectively to an end.
28. As to (a) above:
Beginning in September 2003, and on occasions thereafter too numerous to particularise
throughout the period until May 2007, the Claimant repeatedly made her concerns about
these activities of MsWalker’s visitors known to the Defendant in writing and by telephone
and in meetings with agents of the Defendant.
29. As to (b) above
At no point in the relevant period did the Defendant initiate any legal proceedings against
any of the visitors to flat 14 to prevent them trespassing in the trench’ and/or engaging in
nuisance-causing behaviour when in ‘the trench’, or on the external entrance area to the
block, or in the block’s internal communal areas.
10 Journal of Planning & Environment Law
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30. At no point in the relevant period did the Defendant take any steps to modify the external
entry area to the block or to obstruct access to ‘the trench’ area to prevent visitors to flat 14
from trespassing in ‘the trench’ outside the Claimant’s flat.”
We considered that Octavia’s failure to block access to the trench was perhaps our strongest card, as it
rested more or less on all-fours with the analysis offered inHilton v James Smith.13 In that case, the nuisance
was caused by visitors parking their cars in a private road (in the possession) of James Smith in a way
which blocked tenant’s access to their own parking spaces. Ormrod L.J. offered us a helpful example of
a simple work of improvement to the defendant’s land to abate a nuisance caused by trespassers:
“There was at one stage a suggestion that some of the obstruction was caused by strangers who found
it convenient to park their cars in the private way because they were not permitted to park in the
street, but that difficulty, as the learned judge found in his judgment (and I quote him), was fairly
easily obviated by placing in the entrance one of those hinged posts which can be locked in position
and unlocked by those who have a key.”
A railing across the entrance to the trench would have been similarly easy to install and similarly
effective in its result. In the circumstances of this case, we continued, that was the most obvious of several
reasonable steps for Octavia to have taken:
“32. The Claimant avers that once it had become apparent—as it had done by at the latest early
2004 — that the nuisance-causing activities of Ms Walker’s visitors were substantial and
continuing, it was reasonable in the circumstances to expect that the Defendant would have
promptly taken the steps itemised at paras 29–30 above. The relevant circumstances are—inter
alia :
(a) The Claimant was not in possession of any the land from which the nuisance
emanated, and so could not purse any proceedings in trespass against the persons
causing the nuisance;
(b) The Claimant had no lawful entitlement to effect works to block access to ‘the
trench’;
(c) The Defendant is a registered social landlord, with substantial financial resources
and ready familiarity with available legal remedies;
(d) The detrimental effect of the nuisance on the amenity of the Claimant’s flat was
very substantial;
(e) The Defendant had expressly covenanted with tenants of the block to guarantee
their quiet enjoyment of their respective homes;
(f) The prompt (i.e. early 2004) blocking of access to ‘the trench’ would have
substantially reduced the detrimental impact of the behaviour of Ms Walker’s
visitors on the amenity of the Claimant’s home.
(g) The financial cost of blocking of access to ‘the trench’ would have been insubstantial
to the Defendant given the Defendant’s financial resources.
33. The Claimant accepts that, in response to the Claimant’s complaints about the nuisance
caused to her, the Defendant eventually instigated proceedings to obtain and thereafter
enforce a warrant of possession against Ms Walker.
35. It was not in the circumstances reasonable for the Defendant to seek to address the nuisance
caused to the Claimant by Ms Walker’s visitors solely by means of legal proceedings for
against Ms Walker … because, inter alia:
(a) The majority of the nuisance was caused by persons other than Ms Walker;
13Hilton v James Smith & Sons (Norwood) Ltd [1979] 2 E.G.L.R. 44.
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(b) The time-scale required for the initiation and conclusion of proceedings against Ms
Walker was likely to be substantial, during which time the nuisance would continue
unabated …
36. As a result of the Defendant’s failure to take reasonable steps prevent the nuisance-causing
activities of visitors to flat 14, the Claimant suffered throughout the period September 2003
to May 2007 a substantial diminution in the amenity of her flat.
(i) PARTICULARS
The Claimant was scared to open her front (lounge) window and even to open her
curtains on the said window because of the threatening presence of trespassers in
‘the trench’.
(ii) The Claimant was frequently woken during night-time hours by visitors to Ms
Walker.
(iii) The Claimant was frequently intimidated and threatened by trespassers on the
property.
(iv) Litter and debris was frequently left in the communal areas;
(v) The security of the block was frequently compromised by the habit of visitors to
Ms Walker leaving the entrance door to the block open;
(vi) The Claimant had no confidence that her mail would not be intercepted by visitors
to Ms Walker’s flat.”
In a doctrinal sense therefore the claim was a very conservative one. It was no more than an assertion
that this particular set of facts fell squarely within the boundaries of the Sedleigh-Denfield principle. Terri’s
financial means were such however that if the claim was to proceed it would have to be funded by the
Legal Services Commission (“LSC”), Terri was however in receipt of public funding and Simon and I
had thought very carefully about the justification for bringing the claim.While we thought the legal merits
of the claim were clear, that alone would not suffice to justify a grant of public funding.
Terri’s claim was simply for damages. Octavia had eventually brought possession proceedings against
Ms Walker on the basis of the anti-social behaviour of her and her visitors and—after some
years—succeeded in evicting her. Terri had been Octavia’s principal witness in the case. Given that the
troublesome Ms Walker and her even more troublesome visitors had departed the scene, the claim was in
no way concerned with curtailing an existing threat to Terri’s peaceful enjoyment of her home, which
would have made public funding much more obviously justifiable. In a claim which is just about money,
the Legal Services Commission applies a quite stringent cost-benefit analysis. The relevant provision of
the LSC’s Funding Code was para.5.7.3:
“5.7.3 Cost Benefit—Quantifiable Claims
If the claim is primarily a claim for damages by the client and does not have a significant
wider public interest, Full Representation will be refused unless the following cost benefit
criteria are satisfied:
(i) If prospects of success are very good (80% or more), likely damages must exceed
likely costs;
(ii) If prospects of success are good (60%–80%), likely damages must exceed likely
costs by a ratio of 2:1;
(iii) If prospects of success are moderate (50%–60%), likely damagesmust exceed likely
costs by a ratio of 4:1.”
The claim appeared to us to fall within cl. (i). Our claim for damages assumed that the flat had essentially
been value-less to Terri for the best part of four years, and that an appropriate award would therefore be
12 Journal of Planning & Environment Law
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four years worth of rent; some £15,000–£20,000. However we felt the claim also served a wider public
interest, inasmuch as it rested on the reassertion of a basic common law principle the effect of which had
been rather obscured by prevailing (incorrect) assumptions about the ratios ofMowam and Hussain.
In reaching that decision, we also took the view that the trial would not take very long. In a nuisance
claim, one would usually expect a good deal of the court’s time to be taken up with hearing (over several
days) hotly contested evidence about the nature of the nuisance and its impact on the claimant. In Terri’s
case however, the nuisance that she relied upon against Octavia was precisely the same nuisance that
Octavia had relied upon against Ms Walker in the possession proceedings.14 Indeed, Terri’s witness
statement in this action would in large part incorporate the witness statement she had provided for Octavia
in those proceedings. And of course, in ordering Ms Walker’s eventual eviction the court hearing the
possession proceedings had made findings to the effect that Octavia’s factual case was made out.
Simon and I had also conducted a site visit to the premises at an early stage to talk and walk through
the credibility of a Sedleigh-Denfield claim. It was immediately apparent that the “trench” was our strongest
card. This was both because the “trench” was the physical source of the most serious nuisance Terri had
suffered, and also because it seemed to us very easy for Octavia to have stopped the trench being a source
of nuisance by blocking if off with a rail or lockable gate. I chose the label of “the trench” in part because
it accurately described the relevant area in a physical sense, but also because I assumed it would carry
pejorative connotations to a judge, redolent as it is of the squalour and horror of the Somme.15 We also
made a short movie to exhibit to Terri’s witness statement. As well as giving a visual description of the
layout of the premises, the movie provided Simon with a starring role as: “unwanted visitor standing in
trench making threatening faces through Terri’s lounge window”.
Prior to issuing proceedings, we also tested out the legal basis of the claim in a seminar organised by
the Housing Law Practitioners Association and hosted by Paul Ridge at Bindman Solicitors. Nothing we
encountered there suggested our claim was conceptually problematic. The case would turn we assumed,
on how good a job we could do in evidential terms of convincing the court that it would indeed have been
reasonable for Octavia to take the steps we averred it should have taken. That assumption proved a little
simplistic.
A defence
Octavia is not an especially large housing association. It has roots in the pioneering work of its founder
Octavia Hill in the later nineteenth century.16 It describes itself as: “a forward thinking, not-for-profit
organisation with a strong track record in social housing and providing care services”.17 It submitted a
defence to Terri’s claim which rested primarily on two arguments. The first—a question of fact—was that
the nuisance had not even occurred: Terri was put to strict proof of all her assertions about the behaviour
of Ms Walker’s visitors and its impact on her. The second—a question of law—was that Terri simply had
no cause of action.
Had there been a nuisance?
We were a little surprised—to put it mildly—that Octavia denied the occurrence of the events which were
the basis of its successful possession case against Ms Walker. But we did not think the court would need
14Because Ms Walker qua tenant was responsible under the terms of her tenancy and the Housing Act 1988 for nuisance and anti-social behaviour
caused to neighbours by her visitors, much of the evidence Octavia had invoked against her concerned the actions of those visitors; and especially
those visitors” use of the “trench”.15Which is not to suggest judges are terribly old, but rather that they are familiar with the imagery and history of World War One.16 See http://www.octaviahousing.org.uk/ [Accessed October 22, 2012].17 See http://www.octaviahousing.org.uk/aboutus/ [Accessed October 22, 2012].
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to spend much time in concluding that this aspect of the defence was misconceived. In our skeleton
argument, we made the following observations:
“3. The Defendant denies (Def para 22) that the Claimant suffered such damage. The Claimant
refers the court to her own evidence (CWS; bundle pp.27–41) in this matter. The Claimant
further observes that she was requested by the Defendant to file witness statements on two
occasions in support of the Defendant’s attempts (which were eventually successful) to gain
possession of Flat 14 Whitehill House from its then tenant, a Ms Walker, on the grounds of
anti-social behaviour by Ms Walker and ‘visitors’ to Ms Walker. (These visitors” are the
third parties referred to at para.1 above). The substance of those witness statements is in the
Claimant’s submission wholly consistent with the assertions that she makes in this case.
4. The statement of 11.03.2005 is at bundle pp.99–103. On 30.06.2005, Cath Vadia of the
Defendant (bundle pp.229–230) wrote to the Claimant stating inter alia:
‘I am writing to thank you for all the time and effort you have put into the above case
over the last few months and for your keeping us informed of all incidents as they
occur. I appreciate that it has been a very frustrating and demanding time for you and
the other tenants.’
Ms Vahda acknowledged in the letter that:
‘Nearly all the allegations of nuisance in some way have involved the behaviour of Ms
Walker’s visitors.’
5. The Claimant finds it most surprising in these circumstances that the Defendant denies that
the Claimant suffered any damage. Para 22 of the Defence puts the Claimant to strict proof
of any damage. In consequence the Claimant has had to file in these proceedings several
hundred pages of correspondence between the Claimant and Defendant and internal
documents of the Defendant (all of which are obviously well-known to the Defendant) which
chart the nature of the nuisance between late 2003 and the summer of 2007.”
Compiling the bundle was obviously a quite time consuming and expensive business, and one that
seemed completely pointless in the circumstances. Our best guess as to the defendant’s motives was that
this was simply a knee-jerk reaction to deny everything without any real thought having been given to
whether the denial was soundly based.
A very unusual witness statement
Octavia’s legal argument was also a bit surprising. Rather oddly, the defence was accompanied by a
lengthy “witness statement” written by a solicitor which in substance read like a skeleton argument. The
key assertion Octavia made (variously in the witness statement and its subsequent skeleton argument)
was expressed in various ways:
“The claim concerns the assertion that the Defendant is liable in damages for the anti-social behaviour
caused by its former tenant, a Ms Walker …
The basis for the claim in nuisance is. without merit. The only circumstances in which a landlord
is liable for the nuisance of his tenants is if he has authorised the nuisance …
[Sedleigh-Denfield] has no relevance to the present case because it is followed by a long line of
authorities which consider the extent to which the principle can be extended to render a landlord [sic]
for the actions of his tenants.”
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Octavia presumably misunderstood Terri’s claim.We felt we had made it perfectly clear in our pleadings
that we had no interest at all in Ms Walker qua tenant, and no interest at all in any activities emanating
from land of which she was in possession. What Octavia seemed to be asserting was that because the
presence of the “visitors” on Octavia’s land was “caused” by Ms Walker qua their putative hostess, and
because Ms Walker was a tenant of Octavia, then Octavia were absolved of any legal responsibility for
anything those visitors might do on Octavia’s land. This seemed a quite bizarre proposition; and if “correct”,
one that could only be reached by the House of Lords overturning Sedleigh-Denfield. The defence rested
perhaps on a basic misunderstanding of the law of nuisance; namely that it was a “people” tort rather than
a “land” tort.
A (very) belated strike-out application
The claim was issued in November 2008, and subsequently set down for trial in the Lambeth County
Court in July 2009. In the interim, Simon and I went about the usual process of discovery of documents,
drafting and exchange of witness statements and the preparation of cross-examination schedules and a
skeleton argument.
Then shortly before the trial Octavia filed a strike out application on the basis that we had no cause of
action. The strike out simply reiterated the legal argument made in the defence/witness statement. The
timing of the application was also odd. The point of a strike out procedure is to provide a mechanism for
legally unmeritorious claims to be dismissed before any significant sum is spent preparing for the evidential
matters that a full trial of the issue might entail. Octavia had waited some six months, during which time
we had spent—as had Octavia—quite a lot of money in preparing for a factually contested trial. Indeed,
Octavia served a schedule of costs which ran to almost £10,000. The costs schedule came with a threat
that Octavia would pursue a wasted costs order when it succeeded in its application—presumably both
against Miles and Partners and me:
“… [W]e regard the law in respect of this matter as so settled that we intend to seek an order at the
hearing for our client’s wasted costs in this respect.”
The judgment in the County Court
So we came shortly afterwards before H.H. Judge Gibson in the Lambeth County Court. His Honour was
seemingly rather puzzled by the defendant’s views on the laws of nuisance. H.H. Judge Gibson produced
a short (and for Ms Brumby) very sweet judgment. The salient points were these:
“6. The essence of the claim, on which Mr Loveland concentrated, is based on the tort of
nuisance.
7. [The Defendant’s] argument was based on the context of the alleged nuisance, namely the
connection of all of it in one way or another withMsWalker; and she in the written argument,
and Mr King [for the Defendant] in oral argument, relied on authorities to the effect that a
landlord is not liable for nuisance created by his tenant unless he has authorised the nuisance.
The authorities, in chronological order, are Malzy v Eicholtz [1916] 2 K.B. 308, Smith v
Scott [1972] 3 W.L.R. 783, Hussain v Lancaster City Council [2000] Q.B. 1 and Mowan v
Wandsworth LBC (2001) 33 H.L.R. 616. In each case the claim was founded on the acts of
tenants and members of their households. In Mowan the attempt was unsuccessfully made
to rely on Article 8 of the Convention as a basis for departing from the well-established rule.
8. Mr Loveland did not attempt to gainsay the principle derived from these authorities. But he
said that they deal with a situation which is not alleged byMs Brumby. Although the creators
of the nuisance were connected with Ms Walker in that they were actual or aspirant visitors
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to her flat, none of them were part of her household; and none of the acts complained of was
committed on any part of Ms Walker’s demise. Mr Loveland submitted that an allegation
that Octavia Hill is liable for Ms Walker’s acts and omissions is not part of Ms Brumby’s
case. This is shown by paragraph 22 of the Particulars of Claim: …
So this case now concerns activities on land unequivocally in the possession of Octavia Hill,
albeit some of it (the path leading to the front door and the common parts within the block)
is necessarily subject to express or implied licences to enable tenants and those legitimately
visiting them to obtain access to the areas which are the subject of individual demises.
9. Mr Loveland submitted that once the irrelevance of authorities relating to alleged liability
for nuisance created by tenants is demonstrated there is nothing to take Ms Brumby’s case
outside the ambit of the tort of nuisance as described in Sedleigh-Denfleld v O’Callaghan
[1940] AC 880. He relied in particular on a passage in the speech of Viscount Maugham at
p.894:
‘The statement that an occupier of land is liable for the continuance of a nuisance
created by others, e.g. by trespassers, if he continues or adopts it—which seems to be
agreed—throws little light on the matter, unless the words continues or adopts” are
defined. In my opinion an occupier of land “continues” a nuisance if with knowledge
or presumed knowledge of its existence he fails to take any reasonable means to bring
it to an end though with ample time to do so.’
Mr Loveland also cited passages in the speeches of Lord Atkin (at p.897) and Lord Wright
(at pp.904–905). He submitted, by reference to Page Motors Ltd v Epsom and Ewell BC
(1982) J.P.L. 572, that an action in nuisance may be based on the behaviour of human beings,
no less than on the presence of removable artefacts or manageable natural phenomena, on
a defendant’s land.
10.1 did not find [counsel for the Defendant] to have an answer to this; and the objection that
Octavia Hill cannot be liable for the defaults of Ms Walker simply misses the point as to
what Ms Brumby is—and what she is not—alleging.”
Octavia’s solicitors were correct in one sense in their wasted costs threat: the law in this area was indeed
“settled”; it just happened to be firmly settled in Terri’s favour. Rather than take the case to trial however,
Octavia chose to appeal against the dismissal of their strike-out application.
In the High Court
The case came before Mackay J. in May 2010.18 Neither we nor Octavia had altered our arguments on the
legal question. Happily for Terri, Mackay J. did not seem to be any more attracted to the defendant’s
position than H.H. Judge Gibson had been.
“10 The claimant’s case is put simply therefore this way. This defendant was both owner and
occupier of the approach and entrance to the flats, the common parts within and the trench.
The claimant alleges that she made frequent complaints about the activities of the trespassers
and puts forward certain steps that could, she says, reasonably have been taken to abate the
nuisance such as for example barring access to the trench by some physical barrier or gate.
Whether these propositions are indeed reasonable would be for the trial judge to determine
having heard all the evidence. But the cornerstone of Mr Loveland’s argument is that the
key to the defendant’s liability is its occupation of the land fromwhich the nuisance emanated.
18Octavia Hill Housing Trust v Brumby [2010] EWHC 1793 (QB).
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That is because the very nature of the tort of nuisance is that it is founded on the use of land
in such a way as to diminish the enjoyment of another land owner. It also explains, he says,
why it has been held, as is common ground between the parties, in numerous cases that
where land is let by a landlord to a tenant the landlord is not liable for acts of nuisance
permitted by his tenant unless he has specifically authorised them.
13 Miss Bretherton’s argument turns on the assertion that for there to be a cause of action here
there must be something more than the mere existence of anti-social behaviour on the
defendant’s land, and that a mere failure to abate the nuisance is not in itself enough. In this
case the defendants did nothing positively to encourage or adopt what the trespassers were
doing but at worst merely failed to take active steps to make physical alterations to the
dwelling house by fencing off the trench, installing an entry phone, installing a locked mail
box and the like. She argues that there is no reported example in the cases of such a failure
as this leading to the conclusion that the land owner was responsible for the acts of trespassers.
14 Mr Loveland says one example is the case of Hilton v James Smith [1979] 2 E.G.L.R. 44,
a Court of Appeal decision, where there was liability attaching to a landlord who did no
more than do nothing to prevent the other tenants in the row of shops and/or trespassers
blocking the private roadway over which all the tenants enjoyed a right of way in such a
way as to deprive the claimant whose shop was the last in the row, of all access. In so far
as, in the past at least, trespassers had caused this problem that was, the court held, fairly
easily obviated by placing at the entrance a hinged post which could be locked in position.
But on a perusal of the facts of the case, that the landlord was guilty of no more than mere
passive inaction was clear, and yet it was fixed with liability. As Ormrod L.J. said:
‘There comes a stage when standing by and not doing anything about the obstruction
over which the occupier has complete control and of which he is fully aware it would
be possible to say that he himself was obstructing. But I do not think that we need go
that far. All that we need say is that on the facts here found to be proved by the learned
judge the plaintiffs bring themselves fairly and squarely within the terms of the dicta
which I cited from Sedleigh-Denfield.’
15 … Mr Loveland argues that this is because of the very nature of the tort of nuisance
,dependant as it is on the use of land rather than the actions or the persons responsible for
them which cause the nuisance.
16 In an application of this nature, proceeding as it does on assumed facts, the question of
whether the claimant has a real prospect of succeeding at trial in proving that this defendant,
as owner and occupier of the parcels of land from which the acts of nuisance came, ought
to be found to have continued or adopted those acts by failing to take reasonable steps to
prevent or abate them is an acutely fact sensitive issue and will depend on the view the judge
takes of the evidence he hears. But I am satisfied that the liability in tort of the defendant
can, given a favourable view of that evidence, be established and the claim is not shut out
by the category of case exemplified by Smith v Scott andHussain v Lancaster City Council.
I would uphold the decision of the judge below and dismiss this appeal.”
Octavia then sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Its application was rejected as totally
without merit.
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Conclusion
The High Court judgment attracted quite a lot of interest in legal blogs.19 Some of the comment was very
sensible, but some of it was rather wild. One of the more astute notes appeared on Nearly Legal:
“I’m no fan of Hussain,Mowam etc and would gladly see them overruled, but, in the meantime, this
is a very encouraging way of getting round the problem. Not in all cases, admittedly, but it’s a start.
Fingers crossed that Ms Brumby can succeed at trial as well.”20
Inside Housing gave the case quite a splash:
“Landlords face becoming legally liable for failing to tackle anti-social behaviour on their land after
a tenant won a landmark High Court case.
Octavia Housing tenant Terri Brumby has won the right to sue her landlord over claims it failed
to take reasonable steps to tackle anti-social behaviour on its land.
The landmark High Court case could pave the way for further claims by tenants who feel their
complaints about neighbourhood nuisance have not been properly addressed, the tenant’s lawyer
stated.”21
The comment in Housing and Property Law Daily suggested that Octavia’s (to us) ill-conceived strike
out application was rooted in a more widely shared misunderstanding within the housing law community:22
“High Court approves use of nuisance law to require landlords to tackle problem tenants
Received wisdom was undermined by this potentially significant High Court ruling. The Court held
that, in certain circumstances, it is possible for a successful claim for damages in nuisance to be
brought against a landlord for failures to tackle what can broadly be termed anti-social behaviour.
Due to the conspicuous failure of previous attempts to attach civil liability in such circumstances,
many housing lawyers had assumed that social landlords were effectively immune from civil liability
for their performance in tackling anti-social behaviour. This ruling shows that to be incorrect.”
Notwithstanding such comments, Brumby is not a landmark case in a doctrinal sense at all. It is just a
careful application of an old idea to a new set of facts. It seems likely that most neighbour nuisance cases
are of the Mowam rather than Brumby variety. If there is any nuisance at all from land in the possession
of the landlord—such as a garden, or a communal staircase—then it is likely to be a lesser source of
nuisance than the land leased to the nuisance neighbour. It is equally likely that if a trial on the facts would
take up several days then it would be hard to justify public funding for what may be financially a quite
small claim.
Those conclusions are probably borne out by the fact that since Brumbywas reported there has not been
a long line of solicitors beating a path to my door to ask me to argue similar cases on behalf of their clients.
I have in fact received one brief on the point. And my advice in that case was that there was not a viable
claim to pursue. Which, given that it now looks as though I will be spending £9,000 a year to send my
children through university, is from a personal perspective, really rather a shame.
19 In addition to the sources discussed below see, inter alia, comments from Bevan Brittan Solicitors at http://www.bevanbrittan.com/articles/Pages
/landlordliablenuisancetrespasser.aspx [Accessed October 22, 2012] : Local Government Lawyer at http://www.localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/index
.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3199%3Atenants-claim-that-social-landlord-adopted-nuisance-to-go-to-trial&catid=60%3Ahousing
-articles&Itemid=28 [Accessed October 22, 2012]; Landlord Law Blog at http://www.landlordlawblog.co.uk/2011/03/02/can-landlords-be-liable-to
-neighbours-for-tenants-from-hell/ [Accessed October 22, 2012]; Anthony Gold Solicitors at http://www.anthonygold.co.uk/site/ang_articles/ang
_articles_housing_law_update_2010_andrew_brookes.html [Accessed October 22, 2012].20 See http://nearlylegal.co.uk/blog/2010/07/landlord-liability-for-nuisance/ [Accessed October 22, 2012].21 See http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/ihstory.aspx?storycode=651083 [Accessed October 22, 2012].22 See http://www.housingandpropertylawdaily.co.uk/law-library/2011/05/11/high-court-approves-use-of-nuisance-law-to-require-landlords-to
-tackle-problem-tenants2--10097.html [Accessed October 22, 2012].
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